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THE ROLE OF ENTREPRENEURIAL ORIENTATION AND FAMILY 











The article analyzes how entrepreneurial orientation and the family control of the 
company influence the performance of underachieving firms and how they contribute to 
economic recovery. 
Design: 
We test our predictions on a unique and representative sample of 1500 Spanish small 
firms in high and medium technology manufacturing and service industries. Given the nature 
of our dependent variable, we estimate a series of regression models to test our hypotheses. 
In addition, we use interaction effect where the underperforming firm’s variable is interacted 
with family firms and EO. 
Findings: 
Our analysis contribute to further enlighten our knowledge about underperforming 
firms by showing that entrepreneurial orientation and family ownership have increased 
subsequent performance particularly for underachieving firms. 
Originality: 
The study contributes to expand the literature of underperforming firms analyzing 
how strategic and structural factors affects the performance of firms that face an economic 
downturn. We also provide some guidance for practitioners on the decision and contexts that 
had better serve to the economic recovery of underperforming firms. 
EL PAPEL DE LA ORIENTACIÓN EMPRENDEDORA Y EL CONTROL 
FAMILIAR DE LA EMPRESA EN LA RECUPERACIÓN ECONÓMICA DE LAS 




El artículo analiza cómo la orientación emprendedora y el control familiar de la 
empresa influyen en el desempeño de las empresas con bajo rendimiento y cómo contribuyen 
a la recuperación económica. 
Diseño: 
Testamos nuestras hipótesis en una muestra única y representativa de 1500 pequeñas 
empresas españolas en industrias de fabricación y servicios de alta y media tecnología. Dada 
la naturaleza de nuestra variable dependiente, estimamos una serie de modelos de regresión 
para probar nuestras hipótesis. Además, utilizamos el efecto de interacción donde la variable 
de las empresas de bajo rendimiento interactúa con las empresas familiares y la orientación 
emprendedora. 
Conclusiones: 
Nuestro análisis contribuye a aclarar nuestro conocimiento sobre las empresas con 
bajo rendimiento al mostrar que las empresas con mayor orientación emprendedora cuya 
propiedad sea familiar han aumentado el rendimiento posterior de las empresas, 
especialmente para las empresas con bajo rendimiento. 
Originalidad: 
El estudio contribuye a expandir la literatura de empresas con bajo rendimiento que 
analizan cómo los factores estratégicos y estructurales impactan en el desempeño de las 
empresas que enfrentan una recesión económica. También brindamos orientación a los 
profesionales sobre la decisión y los contextos que mejor sirven para la recuperación 




THE ROLE OF ENTREPRENEURIAL ORIENTATION AND FAMILY 





This article examines how entrepreneurial orientation and the family control of the 
company influence the economic recovery of underperforming firms. We test our predictions 
on a unique and representative sample of 1500 Spanish small firms in high and medium 
technology manufacturing and service industries. Our analysis contributes to increasing our 
knowledge about underperforming firms by showing that entrepreneurial orientation has a 
positive effect on subsequent firm performance particularly for underachieving firms. We 
also show that family control of the firm positively affects the performance of 
underperforming firms. The implications of these findings are discussed. 
 
Keywords: underperforming firms, entrepreneurial orientation, family control, 
economic performance, small firms.  
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Underperforming firms are “organisations whose performance, by any standard, falls 
short… yet whose existence continues, sometimes indefinitely” (Meyer and Zucker, 1989, p. 
19). The phenomenon of underperforming firms has attracted considerable interest from 
scholars from different disciplines including evolutionary (Winter, 1964), organisational 
(Williamson, 1991) and behavioural economics (Bromiley & Papenhausen, 2003) as well as 
sociology (Carroll, 1993; Ruef, 2003). 
Declining firms have been an important part of the scholarly agenda also in strategic 
management. In particular, the topic of managerial response and organisational adaptation to 
firms experiencing performance deterioration has attracted particular interest (Barker & Barr, 
2002; Castrogiovanni, 1991; Filatotchev, Buck, & Zhukov, 2000; McKinley, 1993). The 
main focus has been on the management’s reaction to decline, the problemistic search for 
options to achieve turnaround, and the risks inherent in those options (e.g., Chakrabarti, 
Singh, and Mahmood 2007; Firth, Fung and Rui, 2006). In these studies, the correlation 
between performance and managerial decisions such as strategic change is modelled 
uniformly across firms and with few contingencies. Little is known, however, about how 
those decisions influence subsequent performance, and consequently to what extent such 
change is effective in overcoming the negative situation (Chakrabarti, Singh and Mahmood 
2007; Hatch and Dyer, 2004). Likewise, no studies have clearly established the 
characteristics of the organisations (e.g., ownership type), which may best serve the recovery 
goal. As such, past research on underperforming firms has focused on how firms react to 
underperformance, leaving relatively unattended the analysis of those factors that favour 
economic turnaround. In this paper, we seek to further our knowledge on underperforming 
firms by analysing for the first time two factors that may be important in understanding the 
firm’s ability to revert a negative situation: entrepreneurial orientation and the family control 
of the company. 
While these two factors are important in explaining firm performance (see e.g., 
Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Rauch et al., 2009), it is not clear how they can contribute to the 
economic performance of underperforming firms. In the case of entrepreneurial orientation 
(EO), defined as the strategy-making practices used to identify and pursue opportunities 
arising in the environment (Dess & Lumpkin 2005), many scholars have noted that a firm’s 
EO, despite the fact that it may introduce considerable risks to firms and is fraught with 
difficulties (Abrahamson, 1991; March & Olsen, 1976), could lead to performance 
advantages, long-term competitive advantage, and firm growth (Damanpour, 1991; Lumpkin 
and Dess, 1996; Rauch, 2009; Zahra et al., 1999), as it encourages the innovative behaviour 
of firms and their adjustment to customer needs (Huang and Wang, 2011; Kollmann and 
Stöckmann, 2012 Tang, Chen, and Jin, 2015). Previous studies have also shown that EO 
leads to better performance under environmental hostility (Covin & Slevin, 1989; Covin & 
Covin, 1990; Lumpkin and Dess, 2001), and in dynamic, unpredictable, environments 
(Casillas et al., 2011). However, in spite of its expected benefits, no study has looked at the 
role of EO in favouring the economic turnaround of underperforming firms. In this study we 
argue that EO will have a more pronounced effect on performance for these firms, mainly 
because it encourages them to identify and exploit opportunities, to increase their 
responsiveness to external changes and their capacity to innovate, and to mobilise and fully 
exploit their resources. 
Firm ownership may also influence the likelihood of an economic turnaround. A 
decline in performance is likely to trigger change within firms in an attempt to find a way to 
escape from the negative spiral (Cyert and March, 1963). Such changes may include, for 
example, the exploration of new strategic alternatives or some sort of organisational 
restructuring, which may come up against internal resistance from existing power structures 
that then lead to internal conflicts among various constituencies within the company and thus, 
paralyse the change process (Dougherty & Hardy, 1996; Shane, Venkataraman, & 
MacMillan, 1995). In this context, having a powerful shareholder at the helm may reduce 
goal conflict and facilitate decision-making and change. This may be the case for family 
controlled firms (i.e., family firms). Families are one of the most common types of firm 
owners (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). There is ample evidence indicating that controlling 
families in family firms hold a strong commitment and identification with the firm as well as 
a long-term view that seeks to guarantee the survival of the business and its transfer to the 
next generation (Berrone et al., 2012). Consistent with this, it has been observed that 
controlling families are more willing to accept poorer performance, and to resist short-term 
urges to sell or liquidate (DeTienne et al., 2013; Zellweger & Astrachan, 2008; Zellweger, 
Kellermanns, Chrisman, & Chua, 2012). In this study, we suggest that having a controlling 
family at the helm (i.e., being a family firm) may help the firm to navigate bad times for a 
longer period of time and therefore explore and exhaust all possible forms of recovery from 
bad performance. Despite the above, there is, as yet, surprisingly limited evidence on the 
ability of family businesses to cope with events that require them to be resilient (Revilla et 
al., 2016). 
We seek to fill this gap and contribute to the literature on underperforming firms by 
examining the impact of EO and family control of the firm on the economic recovery of these 
companies. Grounded in previous literature on strategic management, entrepreneurship, 
agency theory, and the socioemotional wealth (SEW) approach, in this paper, we argue that 
while EO and family control may have a positive impact on firm performance, they are 
particularly important to improve the performance of underperforming firms. In doing so, the 
study contributes to expanding the literature on underperforming firms analysing how 
specific actions and firm characteristics impact the performance of firms facing economic 
downturn. We also provide some guidance for practitioners on the decision and contexts that 
better serve the economic recovery of underperforming firms.  
We test our predictions on a unique representative sample of 1500 Spanish small 
firms in high and medium technology manufacturing and service industries. This group of 
firms is particularly suitable to study the influence of EO and family control on the economic 
recovery of underperforming firms, first because entrepreneurial and innovation behaviour 
is likely to be more salient for high and medium technology firms. These businesses usually 
face technological changes and thus need to develop strategies geared towards change and 
innovation (Cloodt et al., 2006; Yu et al., 2018). Also, the influence of controlling owners 
(e.g., a family) on forms’ strategic decision-making process is likely to be more noticeable 
in small firms. Thus, those decisions will more closely match the preferences of such an 
owner. Additionally, the capacity of a single actor to financially support the firm, an aspect 
that is vital in the case of underperforming firms, is bigger in small firms where the absolute 
value of the necessary investment is smaller. Finally, Spain provides an interesting case for 
a study of the factors contributing to the economic recovery of underperforming firms, since 
the period covered by our analysis was characterised by weak general economic conditions 
and a significant number of firms experiencing declining performance. 
The paper is organised as follows: in the next section, we discuss the implications of 
entrepreneurial orientation and family control of the firm on the economic performance of 
underachieving firms, and develop testable hypotheses. Section three describes the sample 
and the measurement of variables. Section four provides the results of the empirical analyses 
conducted to test the hypotheses. The final section discusses the results and summarises our 
findings. 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
2.1. The influence of entrepreneurial orientation 
Strategy making practises incorporate planning, analysis, and decision making, 
together with many other aspects of a firm’s culture, value system, and mission (Hart, 1992). 
In this sense, EO describes firm level strategic processes that businesses use to create 
competitive advantage by using entrepreneurial initiatives to identity and exploit 
opportunities. The exploitation of these opportunities requires a recombination of resources 
to make it possible to generate a profit. As such, EO reflects how a firm operates rather than 
what it does (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996). In this vein, Miller (1983) argues that an 
entrepreneurial firm “engages in product-market innovation, undertakes somewhat risky 
ventures, and is first to come up with “proactive” innovations, beating competitors to the 
punch”. This suggests -and several researchers agreed to this- that EO is a combination of 
three dimensions: innovativeness, proactiveness, and risk-taking (Covin and Slevin, 1989, 
Namen and Slevin, 1993, Wiklund, 1999, Zahra and Covin, 1995). Other authors, like 
Lumpkin and Dess (1996) and Lumpkin et al., (2009), propose the inclusion of autonomy 
and competitive aggressiveness as critical dimensions of EO. Based on Lumpkin and Dess’ 
(1996) dimensions of EO, entrepreneurial orientation applied to small businesses refers to 
how these five dimensions -innovativeness, proactiveness, risk-taking, competitive 
aggressiveness, and autonomy- collectively enable small firms to discover and exploit 
opportunities. 
The strategic management literature has long noted that EO is associated with 
superior firm performance and that the strength of this relationship depends on the presence 
of business and environmental factors (e.g., Lumpkin and Dess, 1996, 2001; Rauch et al., 
2009; Wales et al., 2013; Wiklund and Shepherd, 2003). Here, we argue that EO can be 
particularly beneficial for underperforming firms. This is in line with the view, derived from 
the behavioural theory of the firm (Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 2003) and the related 
prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), that firms and 
managers experiencing subpar performance are prone to try new courses of action and to 
accept the risk inherent to novel strategies. Although risky actions may exacerbate their poor 
performance (Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1988), some specific strategic actions are likely to 
produce organisational recoveries (Bowman, 1982; Morrow et al., 2007). Our suggestion is 
that EO is a particular strategic approach that can be adopted to address and resolve poor 
performance. 
More specifically, we contend that the positive impact of EO on performance will be 
stronger for underperforming firms and will assist them in the process of recovering from 
poor performance. There are several reasons to expect this to be the case. First, EO is likely 
to lead to better performance under environmental hostility (Covin and Covin, 1990 and 
Covin and Slevin, 1999) and under dynamic environments (Casillas et al., 2011) as it helps 
firms to identity and exploit opportunities under difficult circumstances, like poor 
performance. In fact, a firm that rates high in EO helps managers and employees to focus on 
industry changes or demand, and allows them to explore the possibilities offered by new 
technologies. Thus, businesses with EO are more prone to focusing their attention and efforts 
towards discovering and exploiting opportunities, which, given adequate access to resources, 
will translate into improved performance for the underperforming firm.  
Second, EO may be particularly useful for underperforming firms in mobilising and 
exploiting firm resources. Since EO provides a clear direction for entrepreneurial efforts 
(Wiklund & Shepherd, 2005), it will likely help identify the resources necessary to support 
these efforts (Chirico et al., 2011). In this vein, underperforming firms with high levels of 
EO will be more deliberate in using and combining underutilised resources. They will also 
be more likely to look for new business models that can be applied to address their current 
needs. 
Third, specific actions related to innovativeness, one of the major components of an 
entrepreneurial posture, are also likely to have a stronger positive effect on the subsequent 
performance of underperforming firms. As such, it is in negative contexts where new 
initiatives in the form of new products or markets may help the firm to abandon the failing 
business lines and to find new ones that may feed the firm’s finances and overcome the 
negative situation. In fact, firms in decline are more likely than their higher-performing rivals 
to modify their product or service offerings (Ketchen & Palmer, 1999).  
Finally, the proactiveness that typically characterises EO may also play an important 
role in the turnaround of underperforming firms. In fact, creating a turnaround often requires 
proactive actions that are difficult to imitate by competitors (Morrow et al., 2007), which 
may enable them to take advantage of potential emerging opportunities. In addition, a very 
proactive strategic orientation will be particularly beneficial for underperforming firms as it 
allows these firms to be more responsive to externally acquired knowledge (Liao et al., 2003) 
and to intensify their information utilisation efforts (Keh et al., 2007), which ultimately may 
enhance their performance. 
It is necessary to acknowledge that engaging in EO activities is not free of risk. The 
discovery and exploitation of opportunities entails venturing into the unfamiliar and 
committing substantial resources to firms in ambiguous settings (Miller, 1983), in a context 
where such resources are limited. Such limitation may be particularly salient for small 
underperforming firms. However, in spite of this, if successful, the impact of EO on 
underperforming firms will be more noticeable than in firms with already good performance, 
since the former may imply a shift from failing organisations with losses to profitable ones.  
Thus, our first hypothesis is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Entrepreneurial orientation will be more beneficial for 
underperforming firms. 
 
2.2.The influence of controlling families 
Firm ownership may be a factor that can have an effect on firm performance 
(Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). As advanced in the introduction, firms tend to look for 
alternatives to overcome difficult economic situations (Cyert and March, 1963). The existing 
alternatives, which may include for example a company restructuring or the decision to look 
for new markets, may engender internal conflicts among various constituencies within the 
company and paralyse the change process (Dougherty & Hardy, 1996; Shane, Venkataraman, 
& MacMillan, 1995). In this context, having a controlling shareholder at the helm may reduce 
goal conflict and facilitate decision-making and change. According to agency theory (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976), agency costs generally arise due to the separation of ownership and 
management, because of the different preferences and information asymmetries between the 
owner (principal) and the employed manager (agent). In the case of family firms, goal 
conflict between owners and managers would be weaker. Controlling families both own 
significant percentages of firm stocks and are involved in management activities through 
their presence on the board of directors or in the top management team (Sciascia, Mazzola & 
Chirico, 2013). Family members are more likely to share goals, which, to a certain extent, 
avoid the need for incentives (Carney, 2005). This goal alignment reduces the internal 
conflicts that are likely to arise when firms are underperforming (Dougherty & Hardy, 1996), 
favouring a quicker decision making process and the implementation of -sometimes extreme- 
actions aimed at overcoming the negative situation. Thus, the presence of a single controlling 
shareholder may be an advantage for underperforming firms. 
Completing this argument, family control of a firm brings additional advantages to 
underperforming firms. One of the main characteristics of family-controlled firms is that their 
decisions are strongly influenced by their desire to protect their socio emotional wealth 
(SEW) (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). SEW is the stock of affect-
related value that the family has invested in the firm (Berrone et al., 2010) and is a composite 
of different factors such as control of the business, identification of the family members with 
the business, the emotional attachment of family members, or the renewal of family bonds 
through dynastic succession (Berrone et al., 2012). Hence, inherent in family control of the 
firm is a strong commitment and identification with the firm as well as a long-term view that 
seeks to guarantee the survival of the business and its transfer to the next generation. There 
are reasons to expect that this commitment and identification, and what this means for the 
long-term survival of the controlling family, helps underperforming family firms to recover. 
First, it has to be noted that while some authors have argued that controlling families may 
exploit their power position to expropriate minority shareholders and attend family goals 
(Schulze et al., 2001; Schulze et al., 2003), other research has suggested that when 
performance is below the desired levels, family goals and economic goals will tend to 
converge (Chrisman and Patel, 2012). This renewed attention to economic goals is not a 
surprise if we consider that the family’s financial wealth is closely tied to that of the firm, 
and that therefore the family may lose all its financial and SEW if the firm fails (Gomez-
Mejia et al., 2007). 
Second, and linked to the previous argument, controlling family members will show 
greater interest than shareholders in non-family companies to save the company and protect 
their SEW. As noted by Berrone et al., (2012) the key here is that controlling families are 
“more likely to bear the cost and uncertainty involved in pursuing certain actions, driven by 
a belief that the risks that such actions entail are counterbalanced by noneconomic benefits 
rather than potential financial gains”.  In this vein, there is evidence indicating that 
controlling families are more willing to accept lower performance, and to resist short-term 
urges to sell or liquidate (DeTienne et al., 2013; Zellweger & Astrachan, 2008; Zellweger, 
Kellermanns, Chrisman, & Chua, 2012). This patient capital, that is likely to sacrifice short-
term performance to guarantee control and long-term survival of the firm, is an asset of 
family firms as it allows the firm to navigate bad times for a longer period of time and 
therefore explore and exhaust all possible ways to recover. A third and related argument is 
that this commitment with the firm leads controlling families to “actively intermingle 
business and family resources” (Haynes, Walker, Rowe, & Hong, 1999, p. 238) and invest 
all the necessary resources at their disposal to support the firm and help recovery. In this 
vein, Lins et al. (2013) observed that families controlling multiple firms take resources from 
good performing firms under their control to support other firms experiencing financial 
trouble. Thus underperforming family firms may have more resources than non-family 
counterparts to overcome negative situations. 
Finally, this commitment of the controlling family with the long-term success of the 
firm may be valued by the owners of key assets, as it may be interpreted as a signal that the 
family at the helm will do everything in its power to overcome the negative situation. This 
“trust” by external resource providers may improve the access to necessary resources to 
family controlled underperforming firms favouring their chances to recuperate economic 
performance. Taking all the previous arguments into account, we advance the following 
hypothesis: 
 




3.1. Data collection 
The hypotheses are tested on a unique representative sample of Spanish small firms 
in high and medium technology manufacturing and service industries. The population of 
Spanish small firms was initially identified using the SABI database, the most comprehensive 
dataset of incorporated firms in Spain. First, high and medium-high technology sectors (in 
both manufacturing and services industries) were identified using the classification created 
by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the “Instituto 
Nacional de Estadística” (INE). Based on this industry classification, we searched for firms 
with between 10 and 50 employees whose primary or secondary activity code corresponded 
to one of those sectors. In addition, we removed the few firms that were not incorporated 
businesses or limited partnerships (Wiklund et al., 2009), obtaining a total population of 
10,565 firms. A representative sample of 1500 firms was selected to guarantee industry and 
legal form representativeness (sampling error was ±2.34% with a confidence level of 95%). 
Firms were randomly selected within each industry segment for a phone interview conducted 
between November and December of 2010 by a firm specialised in market studies with ample 
experience in conducting similar research oriented interviews. 
Fifteen hundred firms agreed to participate and responded to the questionnaire 
(14.20% response rate). Missing values reduced our effective sample to 1314 for multivariate 
analyses (12.43% effective response rate). We found no differences in terms of size or 
industry between those that participated and those that refused to do so. The survey was 
answered by the firms’ managers.  
Thus, primary data was obtained from the survey questionnaire answered by the 
managers during the interviews. This was the core source of information to measure several 
key constructs of our model. This data was complemented with some secondary information 




Firm performance. In this study, firm performance is measured by Return on Assets 
(ROA), which is an indicator of how profitable a company is in relation to its total assets. 
ROA gives an idea as to how efficient management is at using its assets to generate earnings. 
ROA is calculated by dividing a company's annual earnings by its total assets in 2010. 
Secondary information to compute the firm’s ROA was obtained from the previously cited 
SABI database. To check the robustness of our results, we also used an alternative, more 
market-oriented measure of firm performance, which is sales growth expectation (in 
percentages). This variable takes positive (negative) values when the survey respondent 
expects an increase (decrease) of sales in the following year. 
Independent variables 
Entrepreneurial orientation (EO) . It is measured using well-established scales. 
Specifically, we employed (see appendix) 13 items proposed and employed by Covin and 
Slevin (1989), Lumpkin and Dess (1996) and Lumpkin and Dess (2001). As originally 
proposed, all items were measured in a seven-point Likert scale. These authors considered 
items to approach different dimensions of the EO concept, namely: risk taking, 
innovativeness, proactiveness, autonomy, and aggressiveness. There has been a long debate 
in the EO literature on the unidimensionality or multidimensionality of the construct (Wales 
et al., 2013; Covin and Wales, 2012). The exhaustive review conducted by Wales and 
colleagues (2013: 375) concurs that “the choice between unidimensional versus 
multidimensional conceptualisations should be driven by the research question being 
investigated (Wales et al., 2013: 375)” In our case, the unidimensional conceptualisation 
provides a better fit because our research question is about how EO can have a global impact 
on the recovery of underperforming firms. This view was further confirmed by the empirical 
analyses we conducted. We used an exploratory factor analysis to confirm that a single factor 
that made up the EO construct was properly identified. Cronbach’s alpha for this construct is 
0.70. As expected, the factor analysis revealed the existence of one factor that explained 
64.1% of total variance. The single factor represents EO as the average value of the 13 items. 
This measure ranges between one and seven. The greater its value, the greater the 
entrepreneurial orientation of the firm. Appendix I shows the list of items included in this 
measure as well as the type of scale used. It is worth noting that the statistical test shows that 
this variable is normally distributed. 
Family ownership indicates the percentage of family ownership in the firm. 
Consistent with previous studies (e.g., Gomez-Mejia et al. 2001; Gomez-Mejia et al. 2010) 
and taking into account the size of businesses in our sample, a firm is considered a family 
firm when the respondent confirms that there is a family that directly or indirectly controls 
more than 50% of the company’s shares and at least one family member is on the board of 
directors. This variable is a widely used proxy for family control and influence on the firm 
as it is related to the power and legitimacy of the family to impose its own agenda (Chrisman 
et al., 2012) and to the family goals associated with participation in management (Revilla et 
al., 2016). In this vein, previous research has considered that SEW would increase with 
family ownership, and therefore firm control (Anderson & Reeb, 2003a; Miller et al., 2012, 
Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). 
Under performing. A firm’s past performance is measured by net profits, also referred 
to as the “bottom line” (Smith, N., Smith, V., & Verner, M., 2006; Waldman, Ramirez, 
House, and Puranam, 2001). This is a measure of the profitability of a venture after 
accounting for all costs. In accounting, net profit is equal to the gross profit minus overheads, 
minus interest payable for a given time period. In our analysis, we measure this variable as a 
dummy taking the value of one when the mean value of net profit in the previous three years 
(2007-2008-2009) is less than zero, and zero otherwise. It therefore marks whether the firm 
is underperforming or not. This information about net profits was collected from the SABI 
database. 
Control variables. Firm performance may be influenced by several other factors, 
leading us to include a series of control variables in the estimations. Firm size captured the 
number of a firm’s employees through a question in the survey instrument. This was 
measured as a dummy variable taking the value of one when the firm has more than 20 
employees, and zero when the firm has between 10 and 20 employees (Correa et al., 2007; 
OECD, 1995). Environmental dynamism. We asked respondents about the obsolescence of 
the product as proxy, where consumer preferences and the organisations’ products change 
over time. We used a five-point Likert scale (1=totally disagree, 5=totally agree), according 
to which they assessed whether the products/services and the technology they offered could 
become obsolete in the business sector in which they compete. Intensity of competition. 
Given that the firm’s decision to engage in EO may be influenced by the competitive 
environment (Zahra, 1996), we included a control variable labelled intensity of competition, 
and used a five-point Likert scale where CEOs assessed whether the facility is considered to 
be operating under very intense competition. Absorptive capacity. Based on the important 
role of a firm's absorptive capacity in acquiring, assimilating, transforming, and exploiting 
new knowledge (Wales et al., 2013), which may be key to recovering from 
underperformance, we decided to include it as a control variable. We employed the nine-item 
scale proposed and validated by Cadiz and colleagues (2009), which takes into account the 
assessment, assimilation, and application elements of the absorptive capacity construct 
(Zahra and George, 2002). Responses were provided in a five-point Likert scale. All nine 
responses were loaded in a single factor in exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses. The 
Cronbach’s alpha for these nine items was 0.85, showing high internal reliability. The value 
of the firm’s absorptive capacity was computed as the average value of all the responses to 
the cited nine items. High-tech manufacturing is a dummy variable that takes the value one 
when the firm belongs to a high technology manufacturing sector and zero when it belongs 
to a medium-high technology-manufacturing sector. High-tech service was used as a dummy 
variable that takes value one when the firm belongs to a high technology service sector and 
zero when it belongs to a medium-high technology service sector. Export is a variable that 
collects the percentage of its sales that come from the export activity in intervals. The first 
interval includes up to 5% of sales, the second from six to 15%, the third between 16 and 
25%, the fourth between 26 and 50%, the fifth between 51 and 75%, and the sixth between 
76 and 100%. Firm age is computed as the difference between 2010, the year the survey was 
applied, and the year the facility or plant was founded. Patent is a variable that measures the 
number of patents registered in the last three years. Finally, Manager’s age is a variable that 
measures the age of the firm manager. 
As described above, independent and dependent variables were measured through 
different sources and using different methods to minimise the potential threat of common 
method variance. Nonetheless, to further reduce any remaining concern about a potential 
common method bias problem, we ran, as an additional test, a single factor analysis on the 
survey instrument variables (Podsakoff et al. 2003). The results reject that all the variables 
have significant loadings on a single factor; that is, they reject the existence of a single factor 
capturing a significant portion of total variance. Thus, we are confident that our conclusions 
are free of a common method variance bias.  
 
3.3. Estimation procedure 
Given the quantitative nature of our dependent variable, we estimated a series of OLS 
regression models to test our hypotheses. We began with a model including only control 
variables. We then ran two models separately adding two interaction terms where the 
underperforming firm variable is interacted with EO and family ownership.  
We checked the main assumptions underlying the classical linear regression model, 
under which OLS gives the best, linear, unbiased estimators (Kennedy, 2003). In doing so, 
we decided to use robust standard errors in all our multivariate estimations to mitigate 
concerns about heteroscedasticity. Continuous variables were also centred in order to avoid 
multicollinearity. In fact, variance inflation factors were computed and the results indicated 
that our estimations are free of any multicollinearity problems (Hair et al., 2009). 
 
4. RESULTS 
The means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations are shown in Table 1. 
The mean value of entrepreneurial orientation is 3.81 (on a scale of 1 to 7), while that of the 
family ownership is 39.58% of shares. As shown in Table 1, the relationship between EO 
and subsequent performance of firms is positive and significant. It is also important to note 
that the relationship between underperformance and subsequent performance is also highly 
significant and negative. Multivariate analyses are necessary to provide a more qualified test 
of our hypotheses. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Table 2 shows the results of the OLS regression estimated to test hypotheses 1 and 2. 
This first column shows Model 1, where only control variables are included. Entrepreneurial 
orientation, dynamism, absorptive capacity and industrial high tech sector have a positive 
and significant impact on subsequent performance. This indicates that firms with high EO, 
high environmental dynamism, with more absorptive capacity and competing in industrial 
high tech sectors will have better subsequent performance. The variable indicating whether 
or not the firm was underperforming in the past shows a negative significant coefficient, 
indicating that bad (good) past performers have lower (greater) current performance. Under-
resourced firms have a negative and significant impact on subsequent performance. As could 
be expected, shortcomings in capital availability will also have less successful subsequent 
performance.  
[Table 2 about here] 
The second column of Table 2 (Model 2) shows the results of the OLS regression 
estimated to test Hypothesis 1. The interaction effect between EO and the variable indicating 
past bad performance is positive and significant, thus providing support for Hypothesis 1, 
which means that the positive effect of EO on subsequent performance will be stronger for 
underperforming firms. This effect is presented in Figure 1. As shown, EO improves the 
performance of all firms, but this effect (slope) is stronger in the case of underperforming 
firms. Interestingly, while the effect is positive and significant the figure suggests that the 
improvement in subsequent performance is not big enough to reach positive results. At least 
not during the time frame (one year) considered in this study. In any case, the results suggest 
that while, in the short term, EO may not achieve full recovery it may build capabilities that 
may lead to better than aspired performance in the long term. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
The third column of Table 2 (Model 3) shows the results of the OLS regression 
estimated to test Hypothesis 2. As shown, the interaction effect between ownership and the 
indicator of bad past performance is positive and significant, thus providing support for 
Hypothesis 2. Hence, for underperforming firms, family ownership will be even more 
beneficial than for those firms with a good past performance. Figure 2 displays this 
interaction. For underperforming firms, family ownership helps them to increase the 
subsequent performance level.  
[Figure 2 about here] 
Finally, we test the robustness of our findings estimating the same models using a 
more market-oriented measure of performance, which is sales growth expectation (in 
percentage). Results are shown in Table 3. We found that both EO and family control have a 
positive impact on this growth measure of underperforming firms. Therefore, our findings 
remain robust to the inclusion of this alternative dependent variable. 
 [Table 3 about here] 
 
5. DISCUSSION 
In this article, we sought to contribute to our understanding of underperforming firms 
by examining how entrepreneurial orientation and family control of the firm impact 
subsequent firm performance depending on whether or not the firm was underperforming. 
With this research, we have gone beyond previous studies of underperforming firms that 
looked at the strategic actions pursued by these firms, and have investigated the extent to 
which those decisions and firm characteristics contribute to economic recovery. Results 
suggest that, at least in the short term, there is strong performance inertia. Past performance 
is a significant determinant of future (short term) performance. As observed, 
underperforming firms show systematically lower average performance in the future. 
However, consistent with our view, they also show that while the recent past is a heavy 
weight, manager’s actions and decisions may be instrumental in changing this trend. In this 
vein, we have proven that decisions linked with EO and those referred to the organisation’s 
ownership structure may help the firm in its quest for improvement. 
An entrepreneurial orientation may be particularly helpful for underachieving firms 
in their efforts to overcome the negative situation. Such an orientation is likely to help them 
to seek out new opportunities, increase their focus on developing new innovative products 
and services, and use their underutilised resources more effectively. However, the 
estimations showed that while EO in underperforming firms is positively related to 
performance, it was not enough to reach positive performance in the short term (one year). 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that this may highlight a path that could be followed in 
the future. Particularly, if we take into account that our results have shown that EO also has 
a positive effect on the performance of firms with positive past performance. This is 
consistent with the positive influence of EO on performance showed in the EO literature 
(Rauch et al., 2009). In sum, besides having confirmed the positive effect of EO on the 
performance of underperforming firms, our results hold practical implications since they 
strongly suggest that taking the steps to build an entrepreneurial organisation may be a valid, 
while not easy nor immediate, path towards transforming a failing organisation into a wining 
enterprise. 
Family ownership is another factor that has been revealed to have some relevance for 
underperforming firms. We have argued that in situations of economic downturn, when 
controversial decisions may need to be taken, having a powerful shareholder and owner-
manager goal alignment may provide the necessary speed in the decision making process. 
Controlling families in family firms may be a clear example of such a dominant shareholder. 
The high percentage of stock and the strong involvement in management activities of such 
families favours a decrease in agency costs. In addition, we have noted that families have 
long term goals and a strong commitment with the organisation, which coupled with the tight 
connection between family and firm financial wealth, may help the company to feed key 
asset holders’ trust that the company and its owners and managers will do whatever is 
necessary to overcome the situation. This may be a further asset in a context of performance 
trouble. Evidence seems to be consistent with this expectation, as family ownership has been 
found to be a positive factor for underperforming firms. This result can also be seen as a 
contribution to the old debate in family firm literature concerning the performance 
advantages or disadvantages of family control of firms (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga 
and Amit, 2006). 
Taken together, our findings suggest that a strong commitment to the future of the 
firm appears to be beneficial for the economic recovery of underperforming businesses. On 
the one hand, those firms with an EO, which tend to be innovation-oriented, risk-taking and 
proactive, will be willing to persist with the hope of achieving their goals when they find new 
opportunities that are attractive (Khelil, 2016). On the other hand, family firms are also more 
likely to identify strongly with the firm and, thus, the controlling family will put a greater 
effort into firm recovery. 
 
5.1. Limitations and future research 
Like other studies, our research is not free of limitations, and this introduces several 
future research opportunities. Firstly, the data are cross-sectional. Cross-sectional studies 
hamper inferences about causal relationships or effects over time. To tackle this issue and in 
order to provide a more thorough test of our framework, which implied a causal relationship 
between the variables, our dependent variable captures the performance of the firm in 2010, 
one year after the end of the three-year period used to measure whether or not the firm was 
underperforming, and also the period of time in which the entrepreneurial orientation and the 
ownership structure of the firm was measured. Nonetheless, it would be interesting to see 
what would happen in a longer time frame (e.g., three years or longer).  
Secondly, it should be noted that, while our research design considers EO as a 
unidimensional construct (Covin and Wales, 2012), it could also be conceptualised as a 
multidimensional construct (Wales et al., 2013). We believe that future research should also 
explore potential differences between underperforming firms across the different dimensions 
in which EO has an impact. Although different in nature (Covin and Wales, 2012), the 
unidimensional and multidimensional approaches could be used to complement each other 
and enable a better understanding of the determinants and consequences of EO.  
Thirdly, an increasing number of scholars have argued that family firms do not 
constitute a homogeneous population (Salvato, 2004; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011) but in fact 
differ on a range of dimensions (Klein et al., 2005). The family SEW and ultimately the goals 
and aspirations of controlling families may vary with aspects such as the generation that leads 
the firm (e.g., founder firm versus cousin consortia) or with the presence of non-family 
members in the board (Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2013). These differences may lead to 
differences in reactions to the negative performance situation and, obviously, to different 
subsequent performance. While we lack the necessary information to enable further 
differentiation between different types of family firms, we make a call for future research on 
this topic. 
Fourthly, it is worth noting that our results have been obtained in a sample of small 
businesses (less than 50 employees) where “all revolves” around the entrepreneur 
(Mintzberg, 1984). Hence, some caution about the generalizability of the results is in order, 
as larger firms may somehow compensate the disadvantage of their lack of flexibility with 
their greater access to other resources that may also be important to overcome a negative 
performance situation. Additionally, our sample consists entirely of Spanish firms, thus, any 
inference to other countries must be made with caution. Country-specific cultural and 
traditional influences may reduce the generalizability of our findings. 
Finally, data collection also captured a unique environmental context of economic 
and financial crisis. This added further difficulty to the already challenging environment of 
firms in the high tech and medium-high tech industries, characterised by high degrees of 
dynamicity and stiff competition. This particularly harsh context may have reduced the 
latitude of action of firms, as well as influenced the impact of their decisions on subsequent 
firm performance. We extend a call to other researchers to explore the issues analysed here 
to multiple economic, social and cultural contexts, as well as to time periods absent of any 
global economic crisis. 
In conclusion, the economic performance of small firms in the short term is strongly 
driven by past performance. However, firm owners and managers have a say in the immediate 
future of the business as underperforming firms will be better off taking steps to increase 
their entrepreneurial orientation, as well as under the guidance of a controlling family. 
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Entrepreneurial Orientation scale: 13 items 
In general, management in my firm favors 
1. A strong emphasis on the marketing of 
tried and true products and services  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
& 
A strong emphasis on R&D, technological 
leadership, and innovation  
2. A strong proclivity for low-risk projects 
(with normal and certain rates of return)  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
& 
A strong proclivity for high-risk projects (with 
chances of very high returns) 
3. A cautious, “wait and see” posture under 
uncertainty in order to minimize the 
probability of making costly decisions  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
& 
A bold, aggressive posture under uncertainty 
in order to maximize the probability of 
exploiting potential opportunities  
How many new lines of products or services has your firm marketed in the last 3 years?  
4. No new lines of products or services 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
& 
Very many new lines of products or services 
5. Changes in product or service lines have 
been mostly of a minor nature 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
& 
Changes in product or service lines have 
usually been quite dramatic  
In dealing with its competitors, my firm 
6. Typically responds to actions which 
competitors initiate  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
&  
Typically initiates actions which competitors 
respond to 
7. Is very seldom the first business to 
introduce new products/services, 
administrative techniques, operating 
technologies, etc. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
& 
Is very often the first business to introduce 
new products/services, administrative 
techniques, operating technologies, etc. 
In general, the top managers of my firm believe that owing to the nature of the environment 
8. It is best to explore it gradually via timid, 
incremental behavior 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
& 
Bold, wide-ranging acts are necessary to 
achieve the firm’s objectives 
In general, my firm (Reverse scored) 
9. Supports efforts of individuals and/or 
teams that work autonomously 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
& 
Requires individuals and/or teams to rely on 
senior managers to guide their work 
As per the business opportunities to be identified and exploited, in general my firm  
10. Considers that the best results occur when 
individuals and/or teams decide for 
themselves (Reverse scored) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
& 
Considers that the best results occur when the 
CEO and top managers provide the primary 
impetus for pursuing business opportunities  
11. Individuals and/or teams pursue business 
opportunities make decisions on their own 
without constantly referring to their 
supervisors (Reverse scored) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
& 
Individuals and/or teams have to obtain 
approval from their supervisor before making 
decisions  
12. The CEO and top management team play 
a major role  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
& 
Employee initiatives and input play a major 
role  
In dealing with its competitors, when it comes to capture clients from competitors my firm 
(Reverse scored) 
13. Shows an aggressive behavior 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
& 
It is not particularly aggressive  
 
Table I:  
Means, standard deviations, and correlation of all the variables. Significance levels are based on a two-tailed test, +: p<0.1; *: 
p<0.05; **: p<0.01; ***: p<0.001. 
 Mean S.d. ROA EO Family 
ownership 




ROA 0.4036 0.3652 1              
EO 3.8058 0.0244 0.05 + 1            
Family ownership 39.5811 1.2933 0.0058  0.0407  1          
Underperforming 0.7535 0.0120 -0.2554 *** 0.0189  0.0378  1        
Firm size 0.5905 0.0137 -0.0342  -0.1122 *** -0.0664 * 0.0728 ** 1      
Environmental 









** 1    
Intensity of competition 3.5390 0.0432 -0.0005  0.046 + -0.0304  0.0145  -0.0051  0.1477 *** 1  
Absorptive capacity 3.9961 0.0173 0.0596 * 0.0407  -0.0036  -0.028  0.0146  0.0721 ** -0.0625 * 
High-tech manufacturing 0.0647 0.0069 0.0537 * 0.038  0.031  0.0018  -0.0557 * 0.0154  -0.002  
High-tech service 0.3042 0.0129 0.0291  0.0768 ** -0.1977 *** 0.0463 + -0.0416  0.2788 *** 0.0216  
Export 2.1100 0.2336 0.0028  0.0634 * -0.0023  0.0047  -0.0432 + 0.0406  0.0094  
Firm age 23.8058 0.4828 -0.0611 * -0.0205  0.1768 *** 0.0301  -0.0456 + -0.1341 *** 0.0178  
Patents 1.7051 0.0127 0.0014  -0.1446 *** -0.0262  -0.0054  0.0715 ** -0.0262  -0.0066  
Manager age 45.3206 0.2871 -0.0398  0.0103  0.0395  -0.0331  0.0129  -0.0284  0.0774 ** 
  






High-tech service Export Firm Age Patents Manager 
age 
Absorptive capacity 1       
High-tech 
manufacturing -0.0208 
 1           
High-tech service 0.0831 ** -0.1728 *** 1         
Export 0.046 + 0.0253  -0.042  1       
Firm age -0.0101  0.0186  -0.2911 *** 0.0154  1     
Patents -0.0239  -0.0435 + 0.111 *** -0.0601 * -0.059 * 1   







OLS regression coefficient estimates, standard errors, F statistics, R2s and number of 
observations. Dependent variable in the three models is the ROA (Return on Assets). 
Reported in parentheses are the coefficient standard errors. Model 1 reports the coefficient 
estimates and standard errors for the baseline model with all the control variables. Model 2 
includes the interaction between the underperforming firms and the EO. Model 3 includes 
the interaction between underperforming firms and family ownership. Significance levels are 
based on a two-tailed test, +: p<0.1; *: p<0.05; **: p<0.01; ***: p<0.001 
 Model 1   Model 2  Model 3   
  ROA   ROA   ROA   
EO 0.5683 (0.4038) + 2.2050 (1.0330) ** 0.5733 (0.4029)  
Family ownership 0.0041 (0.0072)  0.0043 (0.0072)  0.0294 (0.0187) + 
Underperforming -7.8893 (1.0312) *** -7.8175 (1.0165) *** -7.9135 (1.0360) *** 
Firms size 0.3233 (0.7776)  0.3614 (0.7787)  0.2478 ( 0.7700)  
Environmental dynamism 0.4097 (0.2387) + 0.3898 (0.2381) + 0.4190 (0.2384) + 
Intensity of Competition 0.0370 (0.2161)  0.0515 (0.2169  0.0291 (0.2166)  
Absorptive capacity 1.1084 (0.6137) + 1.1374 (0.6151) * 1.0896 (0.6090) + 
High-tech manufacturing 3.1537 (1.1211) ** 3.0818 (1.1283) *** 3.1178 (1.1273) *** 
High-tech service 0.0166 (0.9417)  -0.0147 (0.9393)  0.0708 (0.9353)  
Export 0.0085 (0.0748)  0.0057 (0.0743)  0.0074 (0.0739)  
Firm age -0.0303 (0.0210)  -0.0295 (0.0212)  -0.0323 (0.0211)  
Patents 0.6493 (0.8016)  0.5742 (0.7987)  0.6366 (0.8003)  
Manager age -0.0459 (0.0305)  -0.0446 (0.0307) + -0.0443 (0.0306)  
Underperforming*EO   2.1728 (1.0961) **   
Underperforming*Family     0.0334 (0.0202) + 
F 5.75 *** 5.37 *** 5.47 *** 
R square 0.0833  0.0872  0.0859  






Plot of the interaction effect between the EO and the past performance of the firms. 
High levels of EO improve the performance of all firms, but this effect (slope) is stronger in 
























Plot of the interaction effect between the EO and the past performance of the firms. 
For underperforming firms (firms with low past performance), family ownership helps them 








































OLS regression coefficient estimates, standard errors, F statistics, R2s and number of 
observations. Dependent variable in the three models is “Sales growth”. Reported in 
parentheses are the coefficient standard errors. Model 1 reports the coefficient estimates and 
standard errors for the baseline model with all the control variables. Model 2 includes the 
interaction between the underperforming firms and the EO. Model 3 includes the interaction 
between underperforming firms and family ownership. Significance levels are based on a 
two-tailed test, +: p<0.1; *: p<0.05; **: p<0.01; ***: p<0.001. 
 Model 1   Model 2  Model 3   
  Sales growth   Sales growth   Sales growth   
EO 3.0575 (0.7384) *** 5.0453 (1.4266) *** 3.0657 ( 0.7375) *** 
Family ownership 0.0088 (0.0145)  0.0091 (0.0136)  0.0502 ( 0.0269) + 
Underperforming -2.5420 (1.6645)  -2.6292 (1.4292) * -2.5023 (1.4280) + 









Intensity of Competition -0.4820 (0.3791)  -0.4644 (0.4018)  -0.4950 (0.4016)  
Absorptive capacity 1.1874 (0.9777)  1.2228 (1.0012)  1.1568 (1.0009)  
High-tech manufacturing -3.0883 (2.2558)  -3.1756 (2.5327)  -3.1470 (2.5318)  
High-tech service -0.6455 (1.4351)  -0.6835 (1.5044)  -0.5568 (1.5047)  
Export -0.0261 (0.0418)  -0.0294 (0.0738)  -0.0278 (0.0737)  
Firm age -0.1005 (0.0370) ** -0.0996 ( 0.0376) ** -0.1039 ( 0.0376) ** 
Patents -0.8960 (1.3432)  -0.9872 ( 1.3736)  -0.9168( 1.3723)  
Manager age -0.0635 (0.0542)  -0.0620 (0.0602)  -0.0610 (0.0602)  
Underperforming*EO   2.6388 (1.6210) +   
Underperforming*Famil
y 
    
0.0547 (0.0306) 
* 
F 3.62 *** 3.99 *** 4.03 *** 
R square 0.0403  0.0423  0.0427  
N. Observations 1282  1282  1282  
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